The central question is whether Iran can transform its wartime resilience into better governance, greater public trust, and a renewed relationship between the state and society.
Discussions about Iran are often trapped between two extreme narratives. The first views Iran exclusively through the lens of a security threat and the perceived necessity of regime change, seeking solutions to the country’s problems through increased external pressure. The second attributes every criticism of domestic governance, economic difficulties, and social demands to foreign propaganda.
Neither narrative offers a complete or accurate picture of Iran. It is a country with a deep historical and civilisational identity, a diverse and resilient society, and a multilayered political system, while also facing serious economic, social, and administrative challenges. Understanding Iran’s future requires recognising both the reality of external aggression and the country’s right to defend its sovereignty, without overlooking the need for domestic reform.
A nation may require reform while retaining the right to defend itself against external attack. Criticism of Iran’s domestic problems cannot justify war or foreign military intervention. Equally, resistance to external aggression should not result in the denial of internal shortcomings.

What Did the War Change?

The recent war was not merely a military confrontation; it also had political, psychological, social, and media dimensions. Militarily, Iran’s defensive capabilities, command structure, and capacity to respond under pressure were tested. Politically, the continuity and functionality of the state’s core institutions were put to the test. Psychologically and socially, the question was whether fear and insecurity would fragment society or strengthen national solidarity.
In the media sphere, an extensive battle emerged over how the war should be interpreted. Some foreign media outlets portrayed military pressure as a prelude to the collapse of Iran’s political structure and the beginning of fundamental change. The evidence, however, showed that external pressure did not produce immediate collapse. Instead, at least for a period, it strengthened national solidarity and heightened public sensitivity to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This assessment does not ignore the costs of war. The conflict caused human, economic, and infrastructural damage and placed further pressure on people’s lives. Nevertheless, expectations that the state’s principal institutions would rapidly cease functioning and that political collapse would follow were not realised.
Many Iranians distinguished between criticising the state’s domestic performance and defending the country against external aggression. Support for Iran during wartime should not necessarily be interpreted as approval of every domestic policy. This distinction is one of the most important realities overlooked in many external analyses.

Five Sources of Iran’s Resilience

Iran’s ability to withstand military and political pressure can be explained through five principal factors.
The first is Iran’s national and civilisational identity. This identity is rooted in history, language, culture, geography, and collective memory, and it predates the current political system by many centuries. During an external attack, groups that disagree over domestic issues may nevertheless converge around the defence of the homeland and national sovereignty. Such convergence does not necessarily eliminate political differences, but it highlights the priority of defending the country.
The second factor is the religious and moral memory of resistance, particularly the “Karbala paradigm.” For a significant part of Iranian society, Karbala is not merely a historical event or religious ritual. It constitutes a moral language through which concepts such as sacrifice, dignity, justice, patience, and resistance to domination and injustice are understood. Iran’s diverse society naturally does not share a single interpretation of religion. Nevertheless, this paradigm remains an important source of cultural and emotional strength. The interaction between Iran’s civilisational identity and Shia moral memory helps explain why external pressure often strengthens unity and the will to resist rather than producing submission.
The third factor is Iran’s institutional experience in managing crises. Decades of sanctions, security threats, and regional tensions have caused considerable harm to the country’s economy and society. At the same time, they have created a capacity to function under constraints. State institutions, social networks, and local communities have learned how to continue operating under pressure. This capacity should not necessarily be equated with efficiency or good governance; it is primarily an ability to survive and adapt to crises.
The fourth factor is strategic preparedness and asymmetric defence. For years, Iran’s defence policy has focused on developing deterrence, decentralised capabilities, and the ability to impose costs on an aggressor. Regardless of debates about the consequences of this doctrine, its contribution to Iran’s ability to resist military pressure cannot be disregarded.
The fifth factor is Iran’s relative success in the battle of narratives. Contemporary wars are not fought solely with missiles, aircraft, and other military equipment. Official media, social networks, short-form videos, artificial intelligence, transnational networks, and diplomatic language are also part of the battlefield.
During the war, attempts were made to portray military pressure and sanctions as tools intended to help the Iranian people. Many Iranians, however, rejected the claim that freedom and reform could be achieved through bombing, sanctions, or foreign political engineering. They may demand domestic change, but they distinguish such change from foreign intervention.

War and the Return of Security-Oriented Logic

One predictable consequence of war is the strengthening of security-oriented logic within the political system. Under wartime conditions, states typically prioritise control, cohesion, and national security. The enhanced role of security institutions and the narrowing of space for political debate are not unique to Iran; they are evident in many countries affected by war.
This environment poses challenges for civil society activists, academics, journalists, and reformist forces because the language of national security may dominate public discourse for some time. Nevertheless, the temporary prioritisation of security cannot permanently eliminate the country’s social and economic problems.
Once the immediate phase of war has passed, issues such as economic pressure, corruption, administrative effectiveness, individual freedoms, social divisions, generational expectations, and public trust will again move to the forefront. Society may even begin asking more difficult questions: How can Iran defend itself while reforming its institutions? How can institutional accountability be strengthened while national sovereignty is preserved? How can Iran resist external pressure while renewing the relationship between the state and society?

Reform: Not a Foreign Project but a Domestic Imperative

Reform in Iran does not follow a single predetermined path. It may be institutional, economic, legal, media-related, cultural, or administrative. It may be pursued through formal mechanisms, expert-led policy adjustments, social demands, institutional learning among elites, or new forms of public dialogue.
One common error in external analyses is to equate reform with sudden regime change. The experience of many societies shows that sustainable political transformation is usually gradual, negotiated, uneven, and shaped by local history and institutions. Any realistic pathway towards reform in post-war Iran must satisfy three essential conditions.
First, reform must be rooted in national sovereignty and emerge from within Iranian society. Reform associated with military pressure, sanctions, or externally sponsored regime-change projects will lack the necessary social legitimacy and may instead strengthen security-oriented approaches.
Second, reform must be grounded in society’s genuine needs and address issues such as economic dignity, justice, employment, equal opportunity, social respect, and the expectations of the younger generation.
Third, reform must be institutionally feasible. Proposals that disregard the actual structure of power, existing institutions, and the country’s implementation capacity may appear attractive in theory but are unlikely to produce lasting results in practice.
Political renewal can include improving governance, strengthening accountability, combating corruption effectively, expanding economic justice, promoting media responsibility, facilitating intergenerational dialogue, and rebuilding trust between the state and society.

The Role of Civil Society, Youth, and the Media

Civil society faces simultaneous constraints and responsibilities in a post-war environment. Its role is not limited to direct protest. It can contribute to rebuilding trust, defending social dignity, creating spaces for dialogue, supporting local problem-solving, and connecting reform with the national interest.
Young people have a decisive role in this process. Iranian youth live within a global information environment, but they also carry national and local identities, memories, and attachments. They cannot be reduced to binaries such as “traditional” or “Westernised.” The new generation is complex, diverse, and often pragmatic. It seeks greater participation, economic opportunity, social respect, and a meaningful role in determining the country’s future.
The media can either deepen polarisation or help create a more responsible public conversation. Media outlets that focus exclusively on provoking emotional reactions, reproducing hostility, or excluding different voices will deepen social divisions. Responsible media, by contrast, can help society balance the defence of national interests with the necessity of domestic reform.
Religious actors can also play a constructive role. If religious language is used solely to defend the status quo, it may gradually lose its social influence. However, when connected to justice, anti-corruption efforts, accountability, human dignity, and support for ordinary people, it can provide an important moral foundation for social and political renewal.

Lessons of the War for International Actors

One of the war’s most important lessons is that external pressure generally does not strengthen organic reform. War and sanctions often expand securitisation, increase distrust, and further restrict the operating space available to civil society. Such measures rarely create the stability, trust, and institutional capacity required for sustainable reform.
If international actors genuinely care about the future of Iranian society, they should prioritise diplomacy, academic and scientific exchanges, humanitarian cooperation, regional de-escalation, and respect for Iran’s national sovereignty. International engagement should provide space for Iran’s diverse voices to be heard rather than allowing outsiders to decide the country’s future on behalf of its people.
Iran’s experience also offers lessons for other Muslim-majority societies. Political reform cannot be separated from national sovereignty. Religion is neither merely an instrument of political mobilisation nor necessarily an obstacle to reform; it can provide a moral foundation for justice and dignity. The expectations of younger generations cannot be ignored indefinitely. Media narratives have become a form of strategic power. Finally, complex political systems do not collapse simply because external actors predict or desire their collapse.

From Resistance to Better Governance

The central argument is not that Iran has no problems. Its economic, administrative, social, and institutional difficulties are serious and require equally serious responses. The point is that war is not an appropriate instrument for resolving them. External aggression can destroy infrastructure, intensify insecurity, and strengthen hardline tendencies, but it cannot create the trust and political capacity required for meaningful reform.
If Iran is to enter a period of renewal after the war, that process must emerge from Iranian society, institutions, and historical consciousness. The central question, therefore, is not simply whether the Islamic Republic has become stronger or weaker. The more important questions are whether Iran can transform wartime resilience into better governance; whether national unity can be used not only for defence but also for reform and national progress; and whether the moral language of resistance can be connected to justice, accountability, and public dignity.
The answers to these questions, more than the military outcome of the war, will determine Iran’s future trajectory.
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Communication and Media Studies at Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia
** The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of IRNA or the Iranian Government. 
9417